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BIG AND SMALL FISH IN THE SEA OF PATENT LITIGATION: AN 
ANALYSIS OF THE AMP v. USPTO DECISION AND ITS EFFECT ON 
LARGE AND SMALL BUSINESSES 
Kevin Hershey* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On July 29, 2011, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
(hereinafter “CAFC”), in Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & 
Trademark Office (hereinafter “AMP”), held that human genes with a 
known function, both as isolated DNA and in the form of complementary 
DNA (“cDNA”), are patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 
(2012).1 The decision was the first time human DNA was held to be 
patentable subject matter in a court of law.2 While the Supreme Court has 
not yet granted certiorari on the decision, the Supreme Court most likely 
will, because the matter is important to research universities, diagnostic 
medicine, and pharmaceutical companies. Additionally, the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the first case to hold that a 
living organism was patentable subject matter.3 While Diamond involved a 
living organism and AMP involves DNA sequences, the two cases involve 
significant advances in biotechnology and the Supreme Court is likely to 
take up the issue. 
Several problems exist in deciding whether the Supreme Court should 
affirm or reverse the CAFC’s ruling. This article seeks to answer the 
question of whether or not isolated human DNA should or should not be 
patentable subject matter, with the primary focus on the impact patents have 
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1 653 F.3d 1329, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
2 Matthew Poulsen, Jurisprudential and Economic Justifications for Gene Sequence Patents, 90 
NEB. L. REV. 196, 211 (2011). 
3 447 U.S. 309 (1980). 
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on innovation, including commercialization of the technology for 
businesses. The patentable subject matter inquiry is often too narrowly 
focused on the idea that patents create an incentive to invent, and removing 
patentability of a certain subject matter reduces the incentive to invent in 
that particular field.4 As with many existing articles, this article agrees that 
patents do not actually create an incentive to invent. However, this article is 
different in that it focuses on the difference in the use of patents for 
innovation in small and large business, namely arguing that patents allow 
for innovation at the small business level, while a lack of patentable subject 
matter benefits large businesses. The decision to allow or not allow isolated 
DNA to be patentable subject matter should consider which business type 
can bring technology to market the fastest rather than a focus on increasing 
the incentive to invent. 
II. HISTORY OF MAJOR DECISIONS ALLOWING BIOLOGICAL SUBJECT 
MATTER TO BE PATENTABLE 
Patentable subject matter is derived from 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012), 
which allows inventors to obtain patents if they “invent[] or discover[] any 
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”5 
The statute provides little guidance on what should be considered 
patentable subject matter, so the issue has largely been decided by the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (hereinafter “USPTO”), the 
courts, and Congress. Congress first allowed living organisms to be 
patentable subject matter when it passed 35 U.S.C. § 161 (2012) in 1952, 
allowing those who “invent[] or discover[] and asexually reproduce[] any 
distinct and new variety of plant, including cultivated sports, mutants, 
hybrids, and newly found seedlings, other than a tuber propagated plant or a 
plant found in an uncultivated state, [to] obtain a patent.”6 
In 1980, the Supreme Court in Diamond v. Chakrabarty held that 
genetically modified bacteria constituted patentable subject matter under 35 
                                                                                                                           
 
4 U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GENE PATENTS & LICENSING PRACTICES & THEIR 
IMPACT ON PATIENT ACCESS TO GENETIC TESTS (2010) [hereinafter SACGHS]. 
5 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
6 35 U.S.C. § 161 (2012). 
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U.S.C. § 101 (2012).7 The invention at issue in Diamond was genetically 
modified bacteria which could degrade multiple components of crude oil.8 
While the Supreme Court did not decide whether a genetically modified 
bacteria was specifically a “composition” or “manufacture,” the Supreme 
Court held the bacteria was patentable subject matter because it was not a 
“hitherto unknown natural phenomenon, but . . . a nonnaturally occurring 
manufacture or composition of matter—a product of human ingenuity 
‘having a distinctive name, character and use.’”9 
While bacteria are unicellular organisms and are much less complex 
than the plants allowed as patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 161 
(2012), it is possible that Chakrabarty contributed significantly to the 
finding that genetically modified multicellular eukaryotic animal organisms 
could be patented. Perhaps the concept of patenting genetically modified 
animals became more acceptable once multicellular plants and unicellular 
animal cells were both patentable. Whatever the reasons, the next 
significant step in the progression was the USPTO allowing for the 
patenting of the “oncomouse,” a genetically modified animal, in 1988.10 
Finally, a case was brought in the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York by Molecular Pathology seeking to 
invalidate seven patents related to the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes.11 The 
district court held that the isolated DNA sequences were not themselves 
patentable subject matter because they were not “markedly different” than 
what is found in nature, but were merely a purification of what existed in 
nature.12  
The CAFC, however, disagreed with the district court and held that the 
BRCA1 and BRCA2 isolated DNA sequences were, in fact, patentable 
subject matter.13 The court used several justifications for this decision. One 
was that the Patent Office has issued patents for isolated human DNA for 
                                                                                                                           
 
7 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309–10 (1980). 
8 Id. at 305. 
9 Id. at 309–10 (1980) (quoting Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609, 615 (1887)). 
10 U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 (filed June 22, 1984). 
11 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 184 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
12 Id. at 227. 
13 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329, 1358 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011). 
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almost 30 years, and a change in the settled expectations of the inventive 
community should come from Congress, not the courts.14 Another issue is 
that the court used a covalent bond as the boundary between one chemical 
species and another, arguing that severing the covalent bond creates a new 
chemical species.15 In essence, the majority held that when the covalent 
bonds on either side of the isolated DNA were broken (a necessary step 
when excising the DNA), the breaking of the covalent bonds created a new, 
distinct molecule.16 The court focused more on the structure of the chemical 
DNA in the cell than the function of the DNA in the cell.17 
The Supreme Court accepted certiorari and immediately remanded the 
case back to the CAFC.18 The Supreme Court did not decide the case on the 
merits, instructing the CAFC to reconsider the case in light of Mayo 
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.19 When the CAFC 
reconsidered the case, the court kept its same holding as before.20 The court 
held that its holding was still valid in light of Prometheus, and kept most of 
the language from its previous decision intact.21  
III. IF THE SUPREME COURT GRANTS CERTIORARI, HOW SHOULD IT RULE? 
A. Arguments That the CAFC Was Incorrect in Holding That the Isolated 
DNA Was Patentable 
The CAFC provided several reason as to why isolated DNA is 
“markedly different” than DNA in nature. The best argument provided is 
that isolated DNA is just exons, having the introns excised through natural 
processes, whereas DNA in nature includes both exons and introns.22 
Another theory the majority put forward was that, when excised from the 
cell’s native DNA, the resulting cDNA or mRNA required the breaking of 
                                                                                                                           
 
14 Id. at 1355. 
15 Id. at 1352–53. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 1353. 
18 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct 174 (2012). 
19 Id. 
20 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 1337 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012). 
21 Id.at 1331. 
22 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 653 F.3d at 1352–53. 
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covalent bonds on either side native DNA.23 The court held that the 
covalent bonds act as the boundary between one molecule and another.24 
This theory that the cleaving of covalent bonds makes isolated DNA 
markedly different from DNA in nature is problematic in its use of covalent 
bonds as the defining point between “naturally occurring” and “markedly 
different.” The dissent discussed an analogy of isolating DNA from living 
beings compared to isolating elemental lithium from the earth.25 Lithium 
exists naturally in the earth as a salt is isolated by processing the salt to 
create pure elemental lithium.26 The majority dismissed the analogy, stating 
that elemental lithium is the same element, whether it is in the earth or 
isolated.27 The majority did not want to decide the issue of whether 
elemental lithium would be patentable or not, and made an enigmatic 
assertion that if elemental lithium exists in “molecular form” in the earth 
(i.e., a salt), then it is not the same as purified elemental lithium.28 
This analysis presents very indefinite boundaries between what is 
“naturally occurring” and what is “markedly different.” It also, as the 
dissent points out, creates an unusual distinction between different types of 
bonds, some allowed to mark the boundary between chemical bonds, and 
others not.29 The bond in a salt, such as lithium salt, is an ionic bond.30 
Ionic bonds are intramolecular bonds, and though typically not as strong as 
covalent bonds, serve the same function as covalent bonds.31 The decision 
seems to provide little guidance on when the breaking of a bond is 
sufficient to constitute the creation of a new chemical entity for purposes of 
                                                                                                                           
 
23 Id. at 1351. 
24 Id. at 1352. 
25 Id. at 1376 (Justice Bryson, concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 1354. 
28 Id.  
29 Id. at n.3 (Justice Bryson, concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
30 Id. 
31 ROBERT MORTIMER, PHYSICAL CHEMISTRY 898 (2d ed. 2000) (Illustrating how ionic bonded 
solids typically have a melting temperature of around 170 degrees Celsius, compared to a network 
covalent bond with a melting temperature of around 1610 degrees Celsius. Mortimer also states that 
bonds are merely chemical attraction or repulsion, and often put into categories such as ionic chemical 
bonds, covalent bonds, ion-dipole forces, dipole-dipole forces, hydrogen bonds, ion-induced dipole 
forces, London dispersion forces, interatomic repulsions, etc. However, there is no such thing as a pure 
ionic bond, it is rather a degree of polarity in a covalent bond, but it is commonly used in the scientific 
community, and so for this note will be treated as a distinct type of bond from covalent bonds.). 
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patentability. If elemental lithium, purified from its naturally occurring salt 
form, is not patentable, then is the issue the bond strength? Some covalent 
bonds are very weak, weaker than ionic bonds, hydrogen bonds, or even 
Van der Waals bonds, the weakest of intermolecular bonds.32 If the issue is 
not bond strength, is there a requirement for how many bonds need to be 
broken to be considered a “markedly different” molecule? In the case of 
isolated DNA, only a few covalent bonds are broken at each end. There is 
no clear test as to when and why the breaking or formation of covalent 
bonds creates a “markedly different” molecule than one found in nature, or 
whether breaking or forming other types of bonds creates a patentable 
entity. 
These issues could have drastic effects on the chemical industry. 
Almost any manufacturing process or chemical process involves the 
breaking and/or formation of intramolecular bonds. A process as basic as 
adding table salt (NaCl) to water breaks and creates bonds. The NaCl is 
dissociated in the water and becomes an aqueous solution of Na+ and Cl-. 
Breaking and forming bonds alone does not make something “markedly 
different” than in nature because breaking bonds can be very easy, and 
happens in many natural processes. If someone finds a molecule in nature, 
and breaks a bond or two, are they thus entitled to a patent, even if the 
product is the same functionality as in nature? By the reasoning of the 
CAFC, this appears to be the case. 
An argument not adequately considered by the CAFC or the district 
court is that isolated DNA, or even complementary DNA (cDNA), is not 
“markedly different” than in nature because the mechanisms and blueprints 
for the BRCA1 and BRCA2 gene exist naturally. This comports with the 
“product of nature” argument put forward by the dissent and by the district 
court, but it needs more thorough examination by the Supreme Court. The 
method for creating cDNA in a laboratory is well known. The cDNA is 
created by reverse engineering an mRNA molecule. For each mRNA 
                                                                                                                           
 
32 For example, the bond dissociation strength of CD-Na is 3.97 kJ/mol. DAVID LIDE, THE CRC 
HANDBOOK OF CHEMISTRY AND PHYSICS 9–57 (88th ed. 2007). Contrast that number to the typical 
bond strength of hydrogen bonds, 20 to 25 kJ/mol. IUPAC, COMPENDIUM OF CHEMICAL TERMINOLOGY 
1123 (2d ed. 1997). Van der Waals forces, a weak intermolecular force, has a bond strength of about 
4.2-8.4 kJ/mol. HARVEY LODISH ET AL., MOLECULAR CELL BIOLOGY § 2.2 NONCOVALENT BONDS (4th 
ed. 2000). 
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molecule, there can be only one possible cDNA molecule. This is so 
because DNA and mRNA function by using complementary base pairs, 
with guanine pairing only with cytosine, and thymine (in RNA, thymine is 
replaced with uracil) pairing only adenine.33 Because each nucleotide has 
only one possible counterpart, there is only one possible cDNA molecule 
for an mRNA strand. There is absolutely no human ingenuity or design in 
the creation of a cDNA strand. It is the functional equivalent of creating a 
photograph from a negative. Each color has only one opposite color, and to 
create a photograph from a negative does not create a new image, it merely 
creates the exact opposite image. 
Not only is the blueprint for the BRCA1 and BRCA2 gene given to 
scientists by the cells, the method of reverse engineering mRNA to cDNA 
is well known and used in the genetics world. It follows the same basic idea 
as polymerase chain reaction (PCR), where an excess of nucleotides is put 
into solution with the mRNA or DNA and a correct transcriptase or reverse 
transcriptase enzyme. This creates a new DNA molecule using the natural 
mechanics of DNA replication. While this is an oversimplification of the 
process, DNA replication is nonetheless and well-known and commonly 
used process. 
Justice Bryson equated the patenting of isolated DNA with the 
patenting of a leaf snapped from a tree.34 This is not an ideal analogy 
because removing the leaf has no clear usefulness. The BRCA1 and BRCA2 
genes have usefulness as diagnostic tools, whereas a leaf has little benefit or 
use once removed from the tree. A more apropos analogy might be that of 
Velcro, a patented product whose idea came from nature. Velcro was 
designed to imitate a burr’s ability to stick to fabric.35 Even though Velcro 
was designed to imitate a natural product, the Patent Office issued a patent 
for Velcro in 1961.36 
Velcro is patentable because, while inspired by nature, it is a 
synthesized material which does not exist in a natural form. However, the 
                                                                                                                           
 
33 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329, 1335–37 
(Fed. Cir. 2011), judgment vacated sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 
132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012), and opinion reinstated Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & 
Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
34 Id. at 1377 (Bryson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
35 VELCRO®, http://www.velcro.com/About-Us/History.aspx (last visited Sept. 29, 2012). 
36 U.S. Patent No. 3,009,235 (filed May 9, 1958). 
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story of Velcro could be rewritten to mimic the AMP case much more 
closely. Had the inventor plucked the burrs and secured them to a fabric 
rather than inventing an artificial “burr,” it would have been much closer to 
patenting isolated DNA than patenting a leaf plucked from a tree. The burr 
would have been removed from the stem of the plant. The end of the stem 
and beginning of the burr is a boundary between two different parts of the 
plant, just as covalent bonds apparently mark the boundary between 
different parts of the molecule. The fabric with the attached burrs would be 
significantly different than anything found in nature, as burrs are not found 
isolated from the stem and attached to a fabric in nature. While the burrs are 
altered from their natural state, they serve the same function as in nature—
to attach to fabrics and furs. However, it would be hard to argue that this is 
not a product of nature. Isolating genetic material is the same concept. The 
isolated DNA performs the exact same function as in nature (i.e., 
expressing the gene’s phenotype), as do burrs attached to fabric. 
This argument is presented not to minimize the efforts of those 
involved in isolating the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, as the researchers 
doubtless expended a great amount of time and resources in identifying and 
developing the isolated DNA. However, intellectual property rights are 
dependent on the creation of something new, not effort, time, or 
expenditure of resources involved.37 
B. The Supreme Court Should Not Be the One to Allow New Subject Matter 
The Constitution grants Congress the right to grant patents to promote 
the progress of science.38 The justification most often used is that patents 
offer the incentive to invent. The rationale is that inventors need the 
motivation of a legal monopoly to prevent others from “free-riding” on 
their hard work and stealing their invention.39 However, this is a severe 
                                                                                                                           
 
37 See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 364 (1991) (In the 
copyright context, the Supreme Court held that copyright rewards originality, not effort.). 
38 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
39 Nicole Boutros, Race to the Cure: Why Gene Patents Pave the Way for Breast Cancer 
Research, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 1009, 1011 (2011) (“Eliminating genetic researchers’ 
ability to patent isolated gene sequences will destroy the incentives that led to their successes in the first 
place.”); Tina Saladino, Seeing the Forest Through the Trees: Gene Patents & the Reality of the 
Commons, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 301, 315 (2011) (“If the government did not provide patent 
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oversimplification of the motivations of invention, and ignores the hurdles 
associated with bringing a new technology to the market. 
1. Patents May Not Create Much Incentive, Particularly in the 
Academic Field 
Arguably, patents are not essential to invention. In a historical context, 
the current model for patents began in Venice in March 19, 1474.40 Some 
have gone so far as to opine that modern patent statutes are just footnotes of 
the original Venetian law.41 By no means were humans living in caves and 
squalor, using sticks and stones until the Venetians found a way to 
incentivize invention. When Leonardo da Vinci, one of the greatest 
inventors of all time, sketched ideas in the Tratado de Estatica y Mechanica 
en Italiano,42 he did so without the motivation of patents, rather, he did so 
because of his passion as an artist and inventor. 
History is filled with important discoveries and inventions which came 
without the incentives for patents. For example, Penicillin, one of the most 
important discoveries of the 20th century, was not patented because patent 
protection in England was seen as “a repugnant sign of commercialism.”43 
Even without the motivation of obtaining a patent, or even further, with the 
hatred of patenting, England still made some of the most significant 
contributions to modern day science. 
To understand invention and discovery in the sciences, it is imperative 
to look at the invention process, since not all invention or discovery comes 
to fruition in the same way. Genetic research is somewhat different than 
many types of invention. Research is not done in an inventor’s garage or 
workshop, the research is done mostly at universities due to the high risk 
and cost for uncertain results.44 In a report generated by the Secretary’s 
                                                                                                                           
 
protection for isolated gene sequences, laboratories would have little incentive to invest in the cost of 
pursuing such research knowing that others could take from their findings and profit with little 
investment.”). 
40 CRAIG A. NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS 9 (2d ed. 2011). 
41 Id. 
42 LEONARDO DA VINCI, TRATADO DE ESTATICA Y MECHANICA EN ITALIANO (photo. reprint 
1974) (1493). 
43 NARD, supra note 40, at 535. 
44 See Julia Carbone et al., DNA Patents and Diagnostics: Not a Pretty Picture, 28(8) NATURE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 784, 785 (2010) (“In addition, most gene patents relevant to diagnostics are held by 
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Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health, and Society (SACGHS), the 
SACGHS noted that most basic genetic research is funded by government 
organizations.45 Government funding is primarily through grants, and the 
government does not have a financial interest in the discoveries. At the 
early stages of research, success is highly variable, and that is why the 
government, and not private venture companies, funds the research. 
Universities are generally more interested in publishing papers than getting 
patents (see infra). Research is primarily completed at universities because 
there is a large cost associated with scientific research, and large 
universities are capable of attracting government funding. These 
universities are typically more interested in advancing research than 
obtaining patents and commercializing technologies. Most universities are 
not set up to manufacture, market, and sell a patented product, or even sell a 
patent, rather they are in the business of discovery and education through 
cutting edge research. 
The SACGHS report concluded that most basic genetic research is 
completed for factors other than profiting from the discovery, such as 
curiosity, career ambitions, and desire to advance understanding of health 
and disease.46 Many university scientists are motivated by the opportunity 
to publish in prestigious journals such as Science, Nature, or Cell.47 It is for 
this reason that some universities are, informally of course, called “publish 
or perish” universities.48 In these universities, the faculties’ tenure and job 
security depends on their ability to generate publications. Their research is 
spurred on by pressures to publish, not pressures to produce a patent. In the 
academic field, publication in prestigious journals is associated with 
success in the field. A large number of publications means more publicity 
and often greater chances of winning grants. This allows researchers to 
                                                                                                                           
 
universities on the basis of research funded by public money.” A majority of patents belong to 
universities, suggesting that is where most of the basic research is being performed.) 
45 SACGHS, supra note 4, at 2. 
46 SACGHS, supra note 4, at 90. 
47 See Fix the PhD, NATURE 472, 259–60 (2011), available at http://www.nature.com/nature/ 
journal/v472/n7343/full/472259b.html (“Yet many academics are reluctant to rock the boat as long as 
they are rewarded with grants (which pay for cheap PhD students) and publications (produced by their 
cheap PhD students).”). 
48 Daniele Fanelli, Do Pressures to Publish Increase Scientists’ Bias? An Empirical Support from 
US States Data, PLoS ONE 5(4) (2010), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/ 
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develop their research further and make more significant discoveries, 
increasing the prestige of their university. For these reasons and others, the 
SACGHS report concluded that patents do little to incentivize invention in 
the field of genetic research.49 
Genetic discoveries can be incredibly lucrative for pharmaceutical 
companies, however there is an enormous disconnect between the industry 
and academia. The academic community, where much of this research is 
done, seems to give very little thought as to whether or not their research 
tools and results are patented.50 Indeed, there is very little evidence of an 
actual “anticommons” effect in academia.51 The anticommons effect is a 
theory in intellectual property where more than one person or entity owns 
property rights, but none own exclusive rights.52 For example, if pastures 
were divided into lots among a group of farmers, the ownership of 
individual lots would prevent farmers from being able to effectively farm 
because the other lots would block their access to things like water or new 
pastures. The surrounding lots would effectively limit the farmers to their 
own lots and nothing else. In genetic research, this would be akin to one 
holding a patent on a gene sequence, and another holding a patent on the 
method for making the DNA. One would be able to exclude the other from 
practicing their invention, and since each need the other’s method or 
product to practice their own inventions, it effectively shuts both out of 
doing anything. Under such a regime, invention is difficult because 
inventors are unable to use each other’s inventions, and overall progress is 
impossible. 
The fact that there is no empirical evidence of anticommons does not 
mean the Supreme Court should decide upon patentable subject matter 
ignoring the anticommons issue. The absence of anticommons at this point 
in time does not mean that it will never be a problem. If pharmaceutical or 
large biotech companies begin to enforce patents more strictly, and make 
                                                                                                                           
 
49 SACGHS, supra note 4, at 1–2. 
50 Matthew Poulsen, Jurisprudential and Economic Justifications for Gene Sequence Patents, 90 
NEB. L. REV. 196, 229 (2011) (“In the United States, for example, only 1% of the respondents indicated 
that they abandoned a research project due to an existing patent. Further, in their 2005 study, Zhen Lei, 
Rakhi Juneja, and Brian Wright found that only about 10% of respondents indicated that they inquired 
as to whether or not a research tool used in their work was patented.”). 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 227. 
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more inquiries into academia, they could do serious damage to research 
because the atmosphere for anticommons is already in place. In fact, this 
happened with the current AMP case, where Myriad sent cease and desist 
letters to the University of Pennsylvania, and left “many researchers with 
the (wrong) impression that Myriad would not tolerate any form of 
research.”53 Again, just because there is not currently a problem with the 
anticommons, there may be at some point in the future, and it should 
certainly be part of the discussion about whether or not isolated genes 
should be patentable subject matter. 
Patents in the field of genetic research provide little incentive to invent 
and create circumstances ripe for the anticommons, but that should not be 
the end of the inquiry. Patents should also be viewed in light of whether or 
not they promote the commercialization of new inventions. Patents are 
particularly important in the biotechnology field because of the large costs 
associated with bringing a biotechnology product to market. 
2. Patents May Not Help Commercialize New Inventions in the 
Genetics Field 
When analyzing whether or not isolated DNA should be patent 
eligible, the question should ultimately boil down to, “what infrastructure 
best allows for the innovation and advancement of technology, as well as 
gets new technology to the public the most efficiently?” Some have 
proposed different schemes such as mandatory licensing, research 
exemptions, or limiting gene patents to exclude upstream patents.54 This 
                                                                                                                           
 
53 Carbone et al., supra note 44, at 788. 
54 See SACGHS, supra note 4, at 97 (Recommendations included creating an exemption from 
liability for research, creating more transparency in licensing, and creating a special advisory board for 
licensing.); Carbone et al., supra note 44, at 791 (Recommendations included securing more funding in 
university tech transfer offices and better practices in tech transfer offices. Additionally, Carbone 
recommended clearer research exemptions and opposition proceedings in patent law, as well as more 
agency oversight as recommended by SACGHS.); Janice Mueller, Facilitating Patient Access to Patent-
Protected Genetic Testing, 6 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 83, 94 (2011) (Recommendations included either 
creating an outright exemption from liability for patent infringement, or at least some form of mandatory 
nonexclusive licensing with remuneration to the patentee.); Andrew S. Robertson, The Role of DNA 
Patents in Genetic Test Innovation and Access, 9 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 377 (2011) (“These 
considerations suggest that not only are DNA sequence patents not required for innovation in the 
development of gene-based molecular diagnostics, but also they actually hinder the advancement and 
clinical adoption of personalized medicine.”). 
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paper will focus on the commercialization aspect of diagnostic genetic tests, 
such as the BRCA1 and BCRA2 genes, and how patents will likely help or 
inhibit commercialization. The Supreme Court must look beyond whether 
or not isolated DNA is a product of nature and should consider how its 
decision will affect the progress of science. Even if the Supreme Court 
considers the economic impact of isolated DNA, the issue is important 
enough that Congress should take up the issue and conduct a complete 
investigation. 
The economic impact of gene patents is an important consideration. In 
this case alone, the BRCA1 and BRCA2 gene sequences relate to breast 
cancer. Breast cancer cost $13.86 billion in treatment and care in the United 
States in 2006.55 Breast cancer research spending reached $1 billion in 
2007.56 In 2012, the American Cancer Society estimates that there will be 
226,870 new cases of invasive breast cancer in women, 63,000 new cases 
of carcinoma in situ, and 39,510 deaths from breast cancer.57 The American 
Cancer Society also estimates that 1 in 8 women will have invasive breast 
cancer in her life, and the chance of dying from breast cancer is 1 in 36 
women.58 Breast cancer’s economic cost and its impact on women and their 
families is mammoth in scale. If the BRCA1 and BRCA2 sequences are able 
to better diagnose breast cancer and reduce the costs by even 10%, this 
would result in billions of savings in the healthcare industry. Many other 
cancers and health related problems are linked to genetics, and whether or 
not isolated DNA is patentable will have a profound effect on the economy 
and healthcare industry by impacting other potential genetic marker testing. 
To begin the analysis of the economic impacts of the patentability of 
isolated DNA, it is important to distinguish between “invention,” and 
“innovation.” Innovation is much broader than invention, as innovation 
includes commercializing the invention and gaining acceptance of the 
                                                                                                                           
 
55 NATIONAL CANCER INSTITUTE, http://progressreport.cancer.gov/doc_detail.asp?pid=1&did= 
2009&chid=95&coid=926&mid (last visited Mar. 14, 2012). 
56 Breast cancer research nears $1B spent, USA TODAY, Jan. 1, 2007, available at http:// 
www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-01-21-komen-anniversary_x.htm. 
57 AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY, http://www.cancer.org/Cancer/BreastCancer/OverviewGuide/ 
breast-cancer-overview-key-statistics (last visited Mar. 14, 2012). 
58 Id. 
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product in the marketplace.59 David Teece outlined three important factors 
in commercializing a new technology including the appropriability regime, 
the complementary assets, and the dominant design paradigm.60 
Appropriability is where patents come into play. An appropriability 
regime involves the innovator’s ability to prevent imitators from taking 
value from the innovation by copying or “inventing around” the innovation. 
An appropriability regime includes things like patents and trade secrets.61 
Patents are merely a factor in the appropriability regime, and courts must 
break away from the conventional thinking that patents equal progress. 
While strong appropriability makes it easier to gain a market share, it is not 
essential, and weak appropriability regimes can be overcome by 
implementing a solid business strategy based more on the complementary 
assets.62 
Complementary assets are the ancillary requirements for bringing an 
innovation to market. These assets can include machinery to manufacture 
the good, marketing channels, distribution channels, modes of 
disseminating information, brand recognition, etc.63 When the 
appropriability regime is weak, it is important to gain control over the 
complementary assets and gain the market share by strategy, rather than 
through legal monopoly.64  
Complementary assets are incredibly important, arguably as important 
or even more important than appropriability. A strong appropriability 
regime carries no guarantees of successful innovation without the 
complementary assets in place to disseminate the technology. Perhaps the 
quintessential example of a strong appropriability regime with lacking 
complementary assets is the Segway. The Segway had several patents 
protecting its invention, giving it a strong appropriability regime.65 The 
                                                                                                                           
 
59 See David Teece, Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for Integration, 
Collaboration, Licensing and Public Policy, 15 RES. POL’Y 285 (1986), available at http:// 
www.mbs.edu/home/jgans/tech/Teece-1986.pdf (discussing how innovation requires acceptance by and 
diffusion into the market). 
60 Id. at 286. 
61 Id. at 287. 
62 Id. at 290. 
63 Id. at 288. 
64 Id. at 297. 
65 U.S. Patent No. 6,415,879 (filed Mar. 21, 2001); U.S. Patent No. 6,651,766 (filed May 22, 
2001). 
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strength of the appropriability regime is evidenced by the fact that there are 
no imitators, everyone knows the mechanical, gyroscope self-moving 
transport device as the Segway. However, the Segway never reached the 
status its inventors and investors thought it would.66 The venture capitalist 
who backed the Segway said cities would be redesigned around the 
Segway.67 The complementary assets however, such as highway and road 
design, sidewalk design, and the infrastructure already in place at existing 
cities, presented enormous hurdles for Segway. Even with a strong 
appropriability regime, they were unable to capture the market because of 
the almost non-existent complementary assets. Appropriability in this case 
just ensured no one else, even had they obtained the complementary assets, 
was able to take the innovation. In the end, the strong appropriability 
regime helped to ensure the product did not gain any market traction.68 
In contrast to the Segway, the computer industry, particularly the PC 
industry, is one with little appropriability and high complementary assets.69 
The manufacturers of individual components often enjoy a high 
appropriability because they are able to protect their trade secrets and 
obtain patents.70 In contrast, systems manufacturers such as HP and IBM 
have a weak appropriability regime because they do not invent new 
systems, they simply build systems from existing modular components. 
Because system manufacturers have a weak appropriability regime, they 
must rely on complementary assets instead.71 Microsoft did a better job of 
capturing complementary assets than Intel, and it caused Intel to eventually 
sell its business to Lenovo.72 
While complementary assets are very important, this article does not 
seek to minimize the importance of a strong appropriability regime. A 
combination of a strong appropriability regime and control of the 
complementary assets is the ideal situation. This is something Apple was 
                                                                                                                           
 
66 Mark Gimein, Reinventing The Wheel, Slowly, BLOOMSBURG BUSINESSWEEK, at 56 (Sept. 11, 
2006), available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/06_37/b4000411.htm. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Jason Dedrick et al., Who Profits from Innovation in Global Value Chains?: A Study of the 
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able to do by keeping its operating system and its source code secret and 
protected.73 Combined with complementary assets including successful 
marketing, a strong appropriability regime allowed Apple to be the 
dominant market player in goods such as MP3 players (i.e., the iPod), 
tablets (i.e., the iPad), and MP3 sales (i.e., iTunes).74 A strong 
appropriability regime allows those with complementary assets to be the 
dominant market player, for big or small businesses. However, when there 
is strong appropriability and no complementary assets, it can work to stifle 
the technology and prevent it from getting to market, such as the Segway. 
When deciding whether or not patents will contribute to the progress of 
technology and commercialization, it is important to consider how a strong 
or weak appropriability could affect the market for new technologies. 
Complementary assets in the pharmaceutical industry include 
manufacturing facilities, testing capabilities, distribution channels, 
customer goodwill, etc. While it is true that the costs of obtaining 
complementary assets for genetic tests are much lower than for drugs and 
other pharmaceuticals,75 the costs can still be prohibitive. If the Supreme 
Court overrules the court of appeals and affirms the district court, the lack 
of patents in the genetic testing realm can potentially also increase the cost 
of marketing, since DNA patents themselves can offer improved 
marketing.76 This means that the complementary assets for bringing a 
genetic test to market put smaller companies at a significant disadvantage. 
Without the appropriability of patent protection, complementary assets 
become much more important. A strong appropriability regime also allows 
smaller companies to obtain outside funding more easily77 since investors 
will be less worried that another company will be able to steal the market 
share through control of the complementary assets. Therefore, smaller 
companies trying to enter the market will be more likely to lose out to 
                                                                                                                           
 
73 Id. at 102. 
74 Id. 
75 See Robertson, supra note 54, at 37–38. 
76 Id. at 32. 
77 See Jacob D. Moore, The Forgotten Victim in the Human Gene Patenting Debate: 
Pharmaceutical Companies, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1277, 1293 (2011) (“For many biotechnology companies, 
patents are the only means of convincing investors to fund lifesaving genetic research.”). 
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incumbents who control the complementary assets, especially when those 
assets are specialized.78 
The question of whether to patent comes down to who can get a 
product to market faster and better. On one hand, large companies have the 
assets and capital to be able to scale up much faster than smaller companies 
that must obtain outside funding and may not be as familiar with the Food 
and Drug Administration’s (FDA) procedures. However, the quick scale-up 
which larger companies can achieve can also be a disadvantage, as small 
companies which must proceed more slowly are able to make adjustments 
along the way. Alternatively, there could be a combination of large and 
small businesses working together at different phases, where the large 
businesses who control the complementary assets would buy the 
appropriability regime of small companies.79 This is currently done quite 
frequently, such as when Eli Lilly purchased the IP rights to insulin from 
Genentech.80 If, however, isolated DNA is not held to be patentable, small 
businesses will most likely lose the opportunity to create and sell isolated 
DNA, or to sell the rights to a larger company. Larger companies could 
therefore run smaller companies out of business if the larger companies 
control the complementary assets. 
The Constitution says Congress can promote the progress of science, 
not that they must promote the single most progressive option. Congress 
seems to favor protecting small business, particularly with the passage of 
the America Invents Act (AIA) in 2011. The AIA has several provisions 
designed to help small businesses. For example, Section 32 allows for small 
businesses to receive patent assistance on a pro bono basis.81 Additionally, 
Section 10 establishes a micro entity status, which allows very small 
businesses to receive significant fee reductions.82 Lastly, Section 28 
establishes the Patent Ombudsman for Small Businesses Program.83 If the 
Supreme Court takes any guidance from Congress, it should consider 
                                                                                                                           
 
78 Teece, supra note 59, at 292. 
79 Joshua S. Gans & Scott Stern, The Product Market and the Market for “Ideas”: 
Commercialization Strategies for Technology Entrepreneurs, 32 RES. POL’Y 333, 334 (2003). 
80 Id. at 343. 
81 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified as 
amended in 28 U.S.C. § 1454; 35 U.S.C. §§ 123, 257, 298–99, 321–29). 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
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carving an exception for isolated DNA because allowing small businesses 
to capture a strong appropriability regime would allow small businesses to 
protect against larger companies overtaking the market through domination 
of complementary assets. 
This section aims to illustrate the difficulty in trying to improve the 
progression of science. The issue is not as black and white as whether 
patents incentivize or dis-incentivize innovation. The question is very 
complex, and while others have attempted to answer the question on their 
own,84 the large amount of academic work emphasizes the complexity. The 
issue becomes particularly complex in the field of genetic research and 
biotechnology because innovation is very difficult in the field of 
biotechnology.85 The decision should therefore not be made by the Court, 
but should be made by Congress, or through traditional administrative 
agency rule-making procedures with a public comment period. 
However, Congress should decide whether or not to allow patents of 
isolated DNA. Even if Congress agrees with the Supreme Court’s ruling, it 
should still consider the issue with a full investigation and make a law 
confirming or changing the Court’s ruling. The Supreme Court is not as 
well equipped to decide the issue as Congress. In the recent case, Mayo 
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., the Supreme 
Court considered whether a method for determining thiopurine drug dosage 
was patentable subject matter.86 The court avoided the question of whether 
or not patents in the medical diagnostics field would increase or decrease 
innovation, arguing that the Court “must hesitate before departing from 
established general legal rules lest a new protective rule that seems to suit 
the needs of one field produce unforeseen results in another. And we must 
recognize the role of Congress in crafting more finely tailored rules where 
                                                                                                                           
 
84 See generally Matthew Poulsen, Ph.D., Jurisprudential and Economic Justifications for Gene 
Sequence Patents, 90 NEB. L. REV. 196 (2011). 
85 See Moore, supra note 77, at 1293–94 (“[Bringing a pharmaceutical to market involves] the 
process of research, development, and marketing of a [drug, which takes an estimated] average of nearly 
ten years and between $500 million and $2 billion to complete. [L]ess than one percent of biotechnology 
research ventures ever make it to the marketplace. [T]he average biotechnology company will not be 
profitable until their successful products have been on the market for over twelve years. Indeed, only 
about five percent of biotechnology companies are even profitable at all.”). 
86 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). 
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necessary.”87 The Court was absolutely correct in this statement, and 
Congress should take up the issue. 
3. While the Supreme Court Should Accept Certiorari and Make Its 
Ruling, Congress Should Take up the Issue Due to Isolated DNA’s 
Importance in Commerce and Healthcare 
Congress should consider the issue of whether or not isolated DNA 
should be patentable because they are in the best position to do so, and have 
the time and resources to consider many factors. Even if isolated DNA is 
considered a product of nature, Congress can still allow it to be patentable 
subject matter. After all, Congress is empowered by the Constitution to 
grant patents although patentable subject matter has often been left to the 
courts.  
To understand this relationship, it is important to look at patents in a 
historical context. Historically, patents were issued for almost any 
monopoly, whether or not the patentee actually invented the product.88 
Patents were given by the English Crown, which led to abuses of power, 
where the Crown had granted monopolies to its cronies.89 It was under this 
context that Thomas Jefferson, who was diametrically opposed to 
monopolies, wrote the patent statute 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).90 Perhaps it is 
for this reason that Thomas Jefferson avoided making any specific laws 
about what could or could not be patented, and instead left those decisions 
to the judicial system.91 The point made in Part III that isolated DNA is a 
product of nature is a reference to the judicially created rule that products of 
nature cannot be patented.92 As such, the issue has largely been decided by 
the courts, but because isolated DNA is so important to the economy and 
the healthcare system, Congress should conduct a full inquiry and analyze 
                                                                                                                           
 
87 Id. at 1305. 
88 JANICE M. MUELLER, PATENT LAW 22 (3d ed. 2009). 
89 Id. 
90 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3245 (2010) (“Thomas Jefferson was . . . ‘the author of the 
1793 Patent Act.’”) 
91 Id. 
92 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329, 1349 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011) (“Supreme Court precedent establishes that a product of nature is not patent eligible even if, 
as claimed, it has undergone some highly useful change from its natural form.”). 
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the issue. Congress can carve an exception to the product of nature rule, and 
should do so if they find it beneficial to society. 
There are significant benefits to allowing Congress or the USPTO to 
make decisions using administrative agency procedures.93 Not only would 
Congress or the USPTO be in a better position to determine whether patents 
really will increase innovation or not, there is an element of the general 
public to consider. The CAFC relied on the settled expectations of the 
inventing community.94 However, relying on the settled expectations of the 
inventing community rather than the general public is a poor choice. A 
large part of the inventing community has a very real economic interest in 
allowing patents, because patents contribute to an appropriability regime 
which can make it easier for innovators to capture value from their 
invention. Patents balance the interests of the inventing community against 
the general public,95 but the courts seem to ignore the interests of the 
general public. The general public could voice its opinion through a 
comment period or the legislative process, rather than gambling on whether 
or not the courts will hear their concerns.  
Gene patents have a significant effect on the general public and on 
healthcare. The debate rages on, some saying that patenting isolated DNA 
hurts patient access to genetic tests, others argue it helps patient access.96 
                                                                                                                           
 
93 See Michael J. Burstein, Rules for Patents, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1747, 1760 (2011). 
94 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 653 F.3d at 1355. 
95 Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63, 119 S. Ct. 304, 310, 142 L. Ed. 2d 261 (1998) 
(“[T]he patent system represents a carefully crafted bargain that encourages both the creation and the 
public disclosure of new and useful advances in technology, in return for an exclusive monopoly for a 
limited period of time. The balance between the interest in motivating innovation and enlightenment by 
rewarding invention with patent protection on the one hand, and the interest in avoiding monopolies that 
unnecessarily stifle competition on the other, has been a feature of the federal patent laws since their 
inception.”). 
96 Marisa Pins, Impeding Access to Quality Patient Care and Patient Rights: How Myriad 
Genetics’ Gene Patents Are Unknowingly Killing Cancer Patients and How to Calm the Ripple Effect, 
17 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 377, 398–400 (2010) (allowing patents on BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes ruins patient 
access and quality of care); Andrew Robertson, The Role of DNA Patents in Genetic Test Innovation 
and Access, 9 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 377, 26 (2011) (“Without broad licensing, the availability 
of alternative testing techniques, medical second opinions, and testing verification is severely limited. 
This critique of patenting is related to the reduced incentives that monopoly holders have to introduce 
newer, cheaper, or alternative tests.”); contra Peter Edwards, AMP v. Myriad: The Future of Medicine 
and Patent Law, 12 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 811, 843 (2011) (“Moreover, without the patent incentive, 
many genes with important medical implications would never have been sequenced, and thus thousands 
of patients would be without the benefit of decades of medical research.”). 
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Previous articles have discussed whether or not, as a whole, patents stifle or 
promote innovation in the biotechnology field. This article is not intended 
to supplant or discredit any of the previous articles, but is intended to 
illustrate the effects of patents on commercializing technologies, and how 
allowing patents will likely favor small businesses, and not allowing patents 
will favor larger businesses in the biotechnology field. This is but one 
factor the Supreme Court should consider, and more importantly, a factor 
that Congress should consider if it decides to take up the issue of isolated 
DNA patents.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
The economic and social implications of gene patenting are incredibly 
complex issues which need a long, thorough analysis before, as a country, 
we decide to allow isolated genes to be patentable subject matter or not. 
There is a split in academia, the district court, and the court of appeals 
about whether or not isolated DNA is a product of nature or a new 
invention. Whether isolated DNA is or is not a product of nature, the 
Supreme Court must understand that the patentability of isolated DNA has 
a profound effect on the economy and can affect millions of lives. Patenting 
isolated DNA should be analyzed as much as possible before a decision is 
made, and another avenue, such as allowing the legislature to make the 
decision, or creating a comment period by the USPTO, would be a better 
route to determine whether or not it is in the country’s interest to allow 
patents of isolated DNA. The Supreme Court should accept certiorari in 
this case, and should make a ruling with all the knowledge they can muster, 
but the decision should be reviewed by Congress and Congress should 
create law based on their findings. 
